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The Journal of Union's Faculty Forum is published annually for the purpose of providing a visual vehicle for faculty expression. It seeks a wide range of appeal and welcomes submissions from any bona fide faculty member of this institution. The material published herein belongs to the individual faculty member and may be used by him/her as he/she wishes in professional journals. Please submit any material to next year's editor, Dr. Ernest Pinson, Union University, Jackson, TN 38305.
EDITORIAL

These words from William Zinsser's On Writing Well recently leapt from the page as I read them: "The ability to think logically is one of the fundamental skills in nonfiction writing. Anyone who thinks logically should be able to write well. I often think we should teach children simple logic before we teach them how to write."

I know why they leapt at me rather than just ambling. I've said the same thing—in one way or another—again and again, and with more conviction as the years pass. The longer I live and the more I observe, the more I become convinced of the close connection between good thinking and decent writing. The better we think the better we write.

And it works the other way around, too. The better we learn to write, the better we become at thinking. Thus it is no wonder that we have come upon a generation of students who, by and large, are not very adept at either. To solve one problem, whichever we decide to start out with, is to solve the other.

Institutions of higher education have varied in the emphasis they have put on writing, both for teachers and for students. For teachers, these schools run the gamut from "Publish or perish" to "Publish and perish." Many large state schools have been examples of the former to the extent of de-emphasizing good instruction. Some church-related schools illustrate the latter to the extent of relieving professors of their jobs when they have dared to think well and to write and publish their thoughts. There ought to be a balance somewhere.

As for students, we generally have not helped them or required them to refine their skills at thinking and writing. In academia we may manage to rise above the conventional requirement of "Publish or perish." As a culture we cannot rise above the law of life, "Think or perish." The inability, and even the discouraging, of thinking seriously that characterizes our society has weakened and can destroy our very civilization. Our challenge is perhaps both unprecedented and unsurpassed: WE MUST TEACH OUR STUDENTS TO THINK--AND TO WRITE!

Our students need not only instructors in this discipline but role models as well. We need to write more and better! It will quicken our thinking skills; our thinking skills will improve our writing skills. The two will reinforce each other in a complementary way.

If I ever see a statement that says that our willingness to write about what we know best is an overflow of the enthusiasm for what we are doing—assuming that we are doing is what we know best—those words will leap from the page at me too. I couldn't agree more. Somehow the excitement about what we are teaching ought occasionally, at least, to get translated to the written page.

Something else: People who write and publish are not the people who are timid and over-modest about what they are doing. But who says we have to be? Why shouldn't people who have graduate degrees and teach college students have something worth saying? Something that's not being said,
or said well, or said often, or said the way you can say it? We often underestimate ourselves when it comes to writing. To see a few personal "by lines" and to receive an occasional commendation for something we have written from someone whose judgment we respect will raise our self-confidence and free us to do this work better. If you are going to write, why not try to publish something? If you are going to do both, why not let JUFF, who usually goes begging for articles, see it?

In this issue, all written work except for the play by Wayne Alford comes from the School of Humanities. Perhaps this should spur us to a more equitable distribution of responsibility, if not to competition. James and Lillian Baggett, by their articles, are threatening to become the most Shakespearean family since the Barrymores. Judy Kem, whom we shall miss sorely as she joins the faculty of Wake Forest, and Louise Bentley do encores in critical works on authors they have previously published about in JUFF. Wayne Alford distinguishes himself a second time by another superb one-act play. The remaining article was presented as a paper at the Humanities Retreat in the winter. The poem, "Inheriting the Earth," has previously been published in Lighthouse and Old Hickory Review. James Hargett provides our art work in his set of sketches, "Faith, Hope, Charity," distributed throughout this volume.

Ernest Pinson will be editing the next edition. It's not too early for you to begin something for it.
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SUMMIT
A Play in One Act
by Wayne Alford

The scene is the summit of Mt. Olympus. Time: The present. As
the lights come up, ANTHROPOS enters with attendants from R, while HUPER
TECHNE enters with attendants from L.

ANTHROPOS. (Solemnly, as he nods) Greetings, Techne. It is good
of you to come.

TECHNE. (Looking about, sardonically) Well, well, Olympus, home
of the gods. How appropriate, since we are gathered here more or less
to play "god," wouldn't you say, Anthropos?

ANTHROPOS. I prefer to say that we are here because we are in a
strategic position to determine if world society can make a successful
transition from its present, desperate state to a more humane
Twenty-first Century civilization.

TECHNE. "Humane"--you do love that word, don't you Anthropos? How
easily you choose to ignore the fact that humanity was the cause of the
world becoming inhumane in the first place! It is high technology, man,
the essence of the so-called "Third Wave," that has kept civilization
from collapsing altogether from holocausts devised by those ignorant
homosapien fools who squandered earth's natural resources, polluted the
environment, and plunged us all into universal poverty and destitution.
(With eyes flashing) Don't talk to me about another humane society.
Technology is the only means of survival--high technology, untouchable
to the insanity of a genus which, since its inception, has concentrated
on the methodical annihilation of all creation. (With great
deliberation) With technology, there is no margin for error because
there is no error--calculations, production, and long-range
projections are all exactly correct the first time. (Glaring at his
adversary) And those components which become outdated, inadequate,
weak, unusable, are discarded and ultimately destroyed. (Sharply) Face
it, Anthropos. You and your humanity are doomed--long since weighed in
the balance and found wanting! You no longer have anything to
contribute to the new society. You are obsolete--therefore, you are
expendable!

ANTHROPOS. So you would eradicate humanity, would you,
Techne?--abolish the society of creatures for whom the world was
originally created?--

TECHNE. --that depends on your point of view.

ANTHROPOS. --and replace us with a civilization of emotionless,
aestheticless, insensitive computerized robots, which, even in all their
technological perfection, can never know the joy of love, beauty, truth,
and other eternal values which justify our existence--

TECHNE. (Quickly) Don't forget hate, grief, despair, heartbreak,
hunger--
ANTHROPOS. Of course! Those things are also a part of being human--the price we must pay (and well worth it) for the uniqueness of free-will, choice, self-determination. These are what set humans apart from the lower animals--(scornfully) and the tech-nuts!

TECHNE. (Suddenly distracted by something, pointing) What is that strange object glowing brightly off in the distance? (Turning to an attendant) Comvac: Direction, distance, location, and identity of that object: Respond.

COMVAC. (immediately) East-South-East, 778.32 miles; City of Jerusalem in Judea (now Israel); a wooden cross on hill outside city walls, with human male hanging on cross.

TECHNE. (With mockery) Yes, ha! ha!--of course. (Half to himself) The champion of all humanity--quickly and easily destroyed on one of the most crude and primitive instruments of technology--an old wooden cross!-(triumphantly) and by his own human brothers, too! A fascinating bit of irony, isn't it, Anthropos?

ANTHROPOS. Yes--I'll certainly grant you that, Techne!

TECHNE. (Moving in for the kill) Another bit of irony--in fact, a flat contradiction--is your insistence that you humans are self-determining, free-willed, and all that other rot; yet, you have based your origin and existence, and have staked your very hope and eternal fate on the one who hangs on that cross down there!

ANTHROPOS. (Sadly) It is true that many of us have done so.

TECHNE. Humph! A shaky foundation on which to build a new civilization, don't you think? (Straightening himself, smugly) Now we have real total self-determination, total control, unhampered and prostituted by emotions and sentimentality--

ANTHROPOS. (Flustered)--At least we are capable of faith to believe in something, someone! Your kind has no such capacity for faith, because you can't program it through a micro-chip onto a disc like the last census report. Why, you--(checking himself)--oh, what's the use. You wouldn't understand, anyway.

TECHNE. Understand?

ANTHROPOS. Yes. (Dejected) Why, you can't even understand "understand."

TECHNE. (Uncomfortable for the first time) What are you trying to do, Anthropos, confuse me with a lot of-f-f-f-uhh--(his voice suddenly trailing off).

COMVAC. (Alarmed) Oh, no--a cloud has covered the sun--his solar energy is cut off! He must have forgot to set his emergency power pack battery before coming out into open! Quickly, Univac 17, help me switch him over to the battery! (They struggle over him for a moment).

UNIVAC 17. There! He is now restored, Comvac.
ANTHROPOS. Are you alright, Techne? (Moving toward him)

TECHNE. (His voice trailing back up to normal) Ye-uh-es-s-s-s-s-Yes! (Somewhat embarrassed) Sorry--I lost my power temporarily (coughing). Uh, things like that do happen once in a rare while, you know.

ANTHROPOS. (Tongue in cheek, with a faint smile) Yes--oh, certainly, friend. I know what you mean. I sometimes get that way when I miss a meal or two. Of course, I, uh, can feed my own self under such circumstance. (Patting TECHNE on the shoulder) For a moment there, you had me worried.

TECHNE. Friend?--worried? (Suspiciously) Anthropos, you're trying to confuse me again! My system cannot be programmed for a relationship with emotions! So stop it! I told you--Ouch! That power pack charge itches something fierce! (as he scratches)

COMVAC. Here--the cloud's gone, now. I'll switch you back to solar power and set the power pack on automatic this time.

TECHNE. (Relieved) Ah-h-h-h-h. That feels better!

ANTHROPOS. (About to enjoy himself thoroughly) Oh, so you do have sensations, do you, Techne?--that's a human characteristic, you know.

TECHNE. Shut up, Anthropos!

ANTHROPOS. (Looking at his attendants) --And aroused emotions, too!--but I thought you couldn't be programmed for--tell you what, Adam (turning to his attendant), make a note of that. We can plug it into our data bank for future reference. Well, I say, uh, Techne, where were we--oh, say, why don't we talk some more about self-determination and total control, our conversation which was so rudely interrupted by your power failure; or--or,--I'll tell you what: Maybe you'd rather talk more about ways of improving on the longevity of charges in emergency power pack batteries for mobile computers when the sun stops shining?--

TECHNE. Curse you, Anthropos!

COMVAC. Techne, you'd better calm down--you're overheating!

ANTHROPOS. Here, Techne, let me help you (fans him with his cloak).

TECHNE. (Settling down) Alright, Anthropos. You've made your point!

ANTHROPOS. (Earnestly) The only point I want to make, Techne, is what I said in the beginning: It is left for us--humanity and technology together--to save civilization. Granted, man has erred to the brink of disaster in his selfish mismanagement of his environment. But we--you and I--have a chance now, perhaps our last chance, to change the direction of our destiny and develop a civilization more decent and, yes more humane, than ever before. Civilization is for humanity because it is humanity. You can't change that anymore than I can abolish
technology from the face of the earth. But, together, technology and
humanity can team up and insure that we have an earth and a civilization
at all! I am totally convinced, Techne, that humanity cannot have that
insurance without the cooperation and help of technology.

TECHNE. (Moved) A stirring speech, Anthropos. (Eyeing his
attendants) We don't want annihilation anymore than you do. (With
restrained pride) And we do possess, among other things, the speed,
accuracy, and quantitative capacities to do what is humanly impossible
for you to realize your lofty goals of so-called eternal truths and
values.

ANTHROPOS. (Enthusiastically) Yes! And out of such truths and
values will also come ways to improve technology itself--to fashion
still better technology with which to build and create more efficiently,
instead of to destroy. (Turning to COMVAC and UNIVAC 17, and other
attendants, smiling) I'm talking about COMVAC II, III, IV. Techne!--
and UNIVAC 18, 19, 20, and so on!

COMVAC. (Frowning) Comvac II? Mumph! I've never thought about
becoming a father! (Reflecting) It might be kinda fun at that!

TECHNE. Hmmm--I don't know: That sort of thing cuts across our
high-tech grain--a friendly relationship with humans!

UNIVAC 17. That means animals, too! Don't forget, humans have
pets. And it's those cursed dogs loitering around my computerized
parking meters that tick me off. I just can't imagine encouraging the
curs!

ANTHROPOS. (Laughing) You could have a built-in shock treatment
component!

ROBO I. What about video games? I've spent half of my life in the
repair shop because of hoodlum vandalism!

ROBO II. Do what I did. There was one kid who just kept on coming
back to the arcade and roughing me up good--

ROBO I. And--?

ROBO II. Well, he got too close to my screen one night--so I just
ate him!

TECHNE. You what!--

ROBO II. Oh, never fear, Techne. When his daddy came looking for
him, I coughed him up unharmed with a printout across his face that
said: "Teach the brat some manners, or next time I'll perforate his--"

TECHNE. All right--enough of this gibberish! You're all beginning
to sound like a bunch of pool hall humanoids! (To ANTHROPOS)
Anthropos, let's get off this confounded mountain and go down in the
valley where the real world is. We've got a new tomorrow to build
today--together!
ANTHROPOS. (As ALL begin to move toward R exit) Why, Techne, you're beginning to sound a little like a human being yourself!

TECHNE. (Glancing backward) May the Olympian gods forbid! Say, do you think one of those M.I.T. geniuses could develop a new way to charge my emergency power pack battery so the damn thing wouldn't itch so much?

ANTHROPOS. Wouldn't be a bit surprised, Techne.

TECHNE. Oh, and I want you to tell me some more about that fellow hanging on the cross down at Jerusalem--there must be some way to see that technology is never responsible for anything like that again.

ANTHROPOS. (As they exit) You were right the first time, Techne. That wasn't technology's fault. It was man's (lights go down).

CURTAIN
INHERITING THE EARTH
by W. Clyde Tilley

He sped off early to his work
Before the sun could rise.
She lingered while the sun came up
Before her pensive eyes

He strode like madness to his desk.
Each minute had to count.
She tarried long at morning prayers
Before God's Holy Mount.

He flailed about his busy work-
Tense, distraught, and driven.
She calmly moved about her chores
With a grace that God had given.

He earned a fortune from his work
And that of those he hired.
She but a modest living made
And to little else aspired.

He bought a stretch of real estate
With rolling fertile loam.
She rented the simplest house on it
And made of it a home.

He wanted that land across the hill
So he put in longer hours
She, quiet content to have a home
Took time to smell the flowers.

He seldom stepped upon the place
But held deed to the land.
She simply waded in its brooks
And wrote upon its sand.

He had the means to buy the place
And its title bore his name.
She had no means but was the meek
Who owned it just the same.
KING LEAR: RETIREMENT AND REALITY
by James Alex Baggett

Several supposedly definitive interpretations have been given for Lear's suffering—senile stupidity, filial ingratitude, a combination of these, or something else—including Christian, Machiavellian and Freudian explanations. But much like the old Testament books of Job and Ecclesiastes, or the Greek tragedy OEDIPUS, the play poses inexplicable reasons for man's suffering. It offers contradictory causes which appear equally valid. Set by Shakespeare in pagan Britain, the drama leaves all questions open, unbound by dogma (Granville-Barker 1:288). As with other great tragedies, in KING LEAR "the private, the public, and the universal are at one" (Heilman 31), creating more questions than answers—fundamental questions, all without simple, or entirely satisfying, answers.

Part of the interpreter's problem is KING LEAR's failure to demonstrate merited reward, divine intervention, and virtue's victory. Shakespeare encourages anticipation of justice, only to prove it is not necessarily so: the good guys do not live happily ever after; they die. Indeed, of the more than fifty treatments counted by literary historians of this plot about an aged monarch dividing his kingdom among his daughters, only Shakespeare has Cordelia executed and Lear expire, showing that his intent exceeded melodrama or essay (Kozintsev 59). He desired art: drama more akin to a landscape or a symphony than a sermon, meant more to move than to moralize.

KING LEAR depicts an aged sovereign's abdication, suffering, and death. It opens with the announcement that the king will divide his dominion among his daughters—to each according to her assurance of love for him. Through flattery, Goneril and Regan, wives of the Dukes of Albany and Cornwall, respectively, each gets equal divisions, while their young, unmarried sister, Cordelia, who speaks only of duty and filial affection, has her dowry divided between them. When the King's noble friend, the Earl of Kent, comes to Cordelia's defense, he is ordered to leave England. Fortunately, one of her suitors, the King of France, then visiting Lear's court, recognizes her real worth and takes her as his wife. Soon Goneril and Regan conspire against the retired King, whom they call a rash man who will with time only worsen.

This paper focuses upon the stresses caused by the aged monarch's changed roles and what he learned along the way about virtue and justice. Some of Lear's burdens parallel those of retirees elsewhere, or in other generations—displacement, resulting from loss of a vocational identity and too much time with too little responsibility, deterioration of physical or mental health, confrontation with the challenge and prejudice of youth, and alienation from the here and now—other problems relate more to his own persona. At any rate, the subject is Lear, and only secondarily is it concerned with the stresses of retirement, per se.

Before abdication, reality was hidden from Lear. Blinded by adulation, the old king viewed events and individuals with blurred vision. At court, where status came by proximity to him, play-acting usurped sincerity, and everything became "bought: people's looks, their
words, their feelings" (Kozintsev 85). Not really knowing his family or friends, nor the world beyond his castle, Lear viewed fantasy as fact. Not knowing himself, he believed himself valued apart from power and possessions. He saw his own significance as enduring, failing to foresee that without sovereignty he would join the human race, without title he would lose the dignity thereof, without a crown giving him absolute authority even to expel or execute, he would be subjected to the consequences of his behavior.

A well-known legend tells of a sovereign who slips away from his palace for a swim. After leaving his regalia on the shore and diving into the water, he loses his garments to thieves and has to return home naked. But at the gate without his garb he is not recognized. And although he claims to be the king, he is denied entrance and instead is imprisoned. Later he is publicly whipped and mocked as a madman. The moral of the legend is that it is the office (in this case, the clothes) and not the man that makes majesty (Kozintsev 69).

After abdication, Lear is seen in a different light, causing him to face what moderns call an identity crisis. Who is he without position, power, or wealth--without the defined roles that he has known so long? Unable to recognize himself, including his aged body, and feeling himself out of control, his reason paralyzed, he exclaims, "Who is it that can tell me whom I am?" His old court clown's responses are devastating. To the Fool, often the most honest man at court--possibly because his clowning called for sarcasm as well as wit--the King is now "Lear's shadow," which his daughters "will make an obedient father," reversing the natural process, making the child "father of the man," to use Wordsworth's phrase in a different context. Such a paradox, he says, stems from Lear's disastrous decision to divide his kingdom and his hereditary titles. And, no longer having any fear of his former sovereign, he refers to Lear in a vicious volley as a "O zero without a figure," meaning he is without identity and rank (Jorgensen 102). "I am better than thou art now," he says, "I am a fool, thou art nothing."

Before Lear's abdication his daughters gained their identity through kinship with him; now he is known as his daughters' father and on that its importance hinges. When he asks Goneril's steward Oswald, who has been neglecting him, "Who am I, sir?" Oswald replies in all candor, "My lady's father," a response which infuriates the old warrior. Lear's new state is reflected also in the words of Regan who bids her father that "being weak," he should "seem so." As Regan and Goneril have assumed their new roles, they want their father to make himself inconspicuous and inexpensive, demanding that he dismiss half of his one hundred-knight retinue.

But Lear's alienation is not altogether caused by loss of authority; it comes as well from an accompanying ageism, a prejudice others now more openly expressed. The King is, of course, quite conscious of his years. In abdicating, he announced his wish to "unburthen'd crawl toward death." He expects age to confer certain perogatives: respect, understanding, and some indulgence, all of which he receives eventually from friends. But his ego is injured by intimates with their remarks about his senility, causing him to lower his self-esteem and see himself as "a poor, infirm, weak, and despised old man / As full of grief as age, wretched in both."
Goneril and Regan, after eventually receiving their inheritance, look upon Lear as an inconvenience, an "idle old man" in the way. Although he has given them all, they resent the four scores it has taken him. Remembering him as rash, they see his recent behavior—although beneficiaries of it—as totally irrational—and expect only a worsening because of "the unruly waywardness that infirm . . . years bring with them." They insist that he act his age, but after he does, they speak of his being in his dotage, thereby denying him dignity. Like parents, they want to choose his friends. As is typical in these situations, the daughters believe their father to be experiencing a second childhood. They do not believe he knows what is best for himself; consequently, they feel that he should be controlled by them.

Not only had Lear and his situation changed; so had society itself, and he was now less capable of coping. Events threatened even the young and strong: invasion from abroad, intrigue and assassination at home, and corruption and immorality at the top. As Maynard Mack shows, Armageddon appears at hand: "everywhere run tides of doomsday passion that seem to use up and wear away . . . all stable points of reference, till only a profound sense remains that an epoch, in fact a whole dispensation, has forever closed" (142). Albany, in the final lines of the play, sums up this feeling:

The oldest hath borne most. We that are young
Shall never see so much, nor live so long.

Everything and everybody seemed to have lost their place. Old values, like respect, hospitality, patriotism, and reverence, were vanishing. Nothing, or so it seems to Lear, held people together anymore (Colie 185-207). Institutions remained but they had lost their raison d'être; they remained but they were not enough, because they were without those called to service and compassion and controlled by those who valued one another as instruments rather than as individuals. Kent and Edmund were contrasts of the old and new. Kent typifies the old, deference society where duty, honor, truth, and loyalty were not relative terms and codes of conduct and caste were observed. Edmund is the new generation politician, who respects "neither God, nor King, nor father" (Kozintsev 94). Recognizing no authority higher than himself, he boasts: "I grow: I prosper—Now gods stand up for bastards." To him, truth is a commodity, honor is unnecessary, and duty and loyalty go to the highest bidder. "Know thou this," he says, "that men / Are as the time is."

Eventually, "the weight of this sad time" and the Edmunds of the world sweep Lear over the edge, first into madness and then death. Steadily he has been moving toward insanity since dividing his kingdom, disowning his beloved Cordelia, and exiling Kent, his most trusted ally. Lear suspects what is happening to him, but this insight arrives too late. Luckily his madness—which perhaps allows him to cope—is but for a season and he regains his faculties.

Now for the paper's other consideration: What did Lear learn along the way? Or better put: What could he have learned along the way? Actually he never sums up what he concludes. Nor is the drama otherwise an explicit explanation of suffering; rather it is an imitation of life at its tragic moments (Jorgensen 115). So the paper can only suggest
what Lear could have learned and what others can discover through the play about suffering and its relationship to virtue and justice.

The play shows that men do bring suffering upon themselves. Lear finds that a single choice can have unforeseen consequences. Like Coleridge's ancient mariner, Lear lives with his monumental mistake. Unlike the predicament of other tragic figures in Shakespeare, however, Lear's is not ordained or inherited, but self-made. His impulsive, willful error, occurring despite the pleading of Cordelia and Kent, who truly loved Lear, grew out of his own arrogance. The heavens did not conspire against him and the root of his situation was himself, not others. He was not the victim of circumstances; he determined his own fate.

But justice is not simply a matter of sowing and reaping. Some reap, as in the case of Lear, more than they sow. And others reap without sowing. Lear himself proves that far from being equal man's justice is arbitrary and capricious. He rewarded flattery and punished truth and love. And he comes to see in his madness that the system largely reflects the ethos and ethics of the controlling class. He finds that whatever justice there is is the product of man (acting as God's agent or otherwise) and not of divine intervention. Speaking of the masses, composed of "poor naked wretches" having "houseless heads and unfed sides," he says he has "ta'en too little care" of this and that he should have in order to "show the heavens more just." The innocent suffer and no amount of philosophizing will change that. Innocence herself (fair Cordelia), seeing this, says to Lear, "We are not the first who, with the best meaning, have incurred the worst."

Lear proves that virtue is its own reward. Albany speaks of all tasting "the wages of their virtue," but for many the pay is hardly apparent. The drama's most innocent and loving individual, Cordelia, is hanged. Indeed, the ultimate irony comes when Albany says in the closing scene: "The gods defend her!" And Shakespeare writes: "enter Lear with Cordelia dead in his arms." Men must do right because it is right, not because of expected rewards, which may or may not be forthcoming. Men must do right because it affects what they are and what they become. Men must do right because to do so proves what they are, not simply what they expect.

An earlier and longer version of this paper was addressed to the Joseph E. Martin Shakespeare Circle, Jackson, Tennessee, May 22, 1987.
Works Cited


DICHOTOMIES IN SHAKESPEARE'S TWELFTH NIGHT
by Lillian Baggett

Twelfth Night, one of Shakespeare's richest and most complex early comedies, has just recently gained the critical attention that it deserves. A play rich in characterizations, themes, and tonalities, Twelfth Night has a universality that is attested by the play's particular appeal and popularity among twentieth-century readers and playgoers; indeed, it can be argued that Twelfth Night is the culmination of Shakespeare's early comic artistry. An examination of the play's central elements—its characters, themes, and tonalities—will help us appreciate not only Shakespeare's universal appeal but his developing comic artistry.

Early Shakespearean comedies contributed character types, but in Twelfth Night, Shakespeare seemed to find a kind of liberation from a dependence upon stock characters. The characters of Twelfth Night are of flesh and blood, exhibiting all the complexities of human nature. As the playwright began to create more and more of his characters instead of borrowing them from other sources, his characters became more lifelike, more complex and paradoxical (possessing both good and evil impulses), and consequently much more interesting.

The complexities of the themes, qualified as they are by undercurrents of illusion, sadness, identity crises, madness, time-disorientation, and situational ironies, not only give Twelfth Night its particular flavor but also attract twentieth-century interest in ways that many of Shakespeare's earlier, more rigid, stylized plays do not. To the twentieth-century reader or playgoer one of Twelfth Night's most intriguing themes is man's difficulty in discerning the real. Of course, modern technology has only exaggerated a problem that was as difficult for Elizabethans as it is for us today. In Twelfth Night, reality for Sir Toby and Maria is believing that Malvolio is not free and that they are free. Ironically, each Illyrian is imprisoned by his own illusions (a predicament shared by modern man), and a macabre aspect of the play swims into focus when the playgoer observes these "imprisoned" Illyrians acting as if they were free. The melancholy background music of Twelfth Night adds to this disturbing tonality.

Another uncertainty of universal as well as modern interest is the matter of whether two wrongs ever constitute a right. Shakespeare explored this theme at great length in several of his comedies, but it receives its most extended and extensive treatment in Twelfth Night. Shakespeare explored this problem in considerable detail in The Merchant of Venice, and the fact that he returned to it in Twelfth Night suggests his central concern with the ethical and legal strictures placed on human action.

Yet another uncertainty explored by Twelfth Night is the fragile and changing sense of identity which tantalizes man into a quest for a surer view of himself and his place in the cosmos. Such quests are extremely difficult, often dangerous, and occasionally impeded by dubious motives and deluding "darkness," as Malvolio and other searchers for light in Twelfth Night discover. Indeed, the madness, darkness, and
despair that course through the supposedly comic world of Twelfth Night suggest ambiguities and difficulties that would come to haunt not only Hamlet's Denmark but, many twentieth-century commentators argue, our own world as well.

Perhaps the most significant, fascinating--and understandable--theme in Twelfth Night, as far as the modern reader is concerned, is the alienation theme. However comic Malvolio's ostracism and imprisonment may seem at first glance, the underlying pathos--with its echoes of madness, deception, injustice and defeat--serves to remind us that Malvolio is very much alone in the play, from beginning to end. Nor is his alienation, for all its overtones of modern angst, the only one in the play--for with a jolt we remember too that Viola, Sebastian, Antonio, Orsino, Olivia--indeed, virtually all the characters in the play--have cut themselves off from or have been cut off by human and social contact.

In Twelfth Night, as well as in Shakespeare's other comedies, the spirit prevailing at the end of the play is one of reconciliation. The Duke orders someone to "pursue him [Malvolio] and entreat him to a peace" (TN 5.1). Malvolio, however, shuns the new Illyrian establishment, choosing instead to insulate himself against future anguish by standing well away from those who have wronged him. In several respects Malvolio resembles Shylock of The Merchant of Venice. As each of these plays end, each man (Shylock in The Merchant of Venice and Malvolio in Twelfth Night) stands singly silhouetted: Shylock in a stance of defeat and Malvolio with his fist raised high in anger. Seen together they serve as classic examples of man's reaction against alienation.

Twelfth Night, or What You Will enjoys the double distinction of being the only play to which Shakespeare attached an exact calendar date and an alternate title. The proliferation of criticism concerning the title attests to its significance. L. G. Salinger suggests that the main title implies a "time of misrule . . . and gives the underlying constructive principle of the whole play" (118). The alternate title, "What You Will," conjures up visions of sundry excesses, and it invites each playgoer to choose his own indulgence for that proscribed period during which Time is suspended and the celebrants are allowed to join in the festivities without any fear of censure or reprisal. The prevailing atmosphere is carnival-like, and it is contagious to practically everyone--both on and off the stage.

Shakespeare in Twelfth Night seems deliberately to have suggested countless dichotomies. The critics have felt free to decide for themselves whether Twelfth Night is romantic or realistic; nonsensical or meaningful; a celebration of love or a disparagement of love; escapist literature or social commentary; festive comedy or moral comedy; comedy of humours or comedy of manners; and--perhaps the most intriguing of all--comic or tragic in its dénouement.

The critical debates, the importance of the play for understanding Shakespeare's early development as a comic artist, and, indeed, the disturbing tonalities and particular modernness of the play compel a reexamination of Twelfth Night's central elements--its central characters, themes, and images--so that we might answer otherwise
perplexing questions. For instance, if Twelfth Night is a comedy, then why is its music so sad? Why does the playgoer laugh at the foibles of characters such as Malvolio, only to wonder later why he laughed at some particular moment instead of cried? In this connection, Walter N. King speaks of Twelfth Night's "underlying melancholy," despite the fact that the play is "comic through and through" (2). King cleverly and graphically describes and assesses Twelfth Night's alternating perspectives in this manner: "With Sir Toby's first belch revelry as a way of life seems somehow less appealing" (8). The intrusion of reality upon illusion has an especially jarring effect upon the carnival-like atmosphere which prevails in Illyria. Perhaps the only way one can approach sanely the starkness of reality is through a sense of humor. If this hypothesis is true, then it explains why the humorless Malvolio is unable to perceive the reality of his situation.

One of the disturbing tonalities of Twelfth Night is the impression gained that the reveller not only is unable to ascertain the identities of those around him but also is powerless to gaze behind his own mask. One exception is Viola; she warns Olivia: "I am not what I am" (3.1) King labels Viola's confession "the beginning of an introspective movement whose culmination in Freud and Jung and their disciples" cannot be ignored by the twentieth century (14). The solitary figure of Feste as he listens to the wind and the rain discomforts those individuals who themselves avoid being alone. The very fact that Feste can be so alone, notwithstanding all the characters who fill Illyria, reminds one that sooner or later he will have to face a similar predicament: aloneness; and that, at that point, he will have to face himself. Likewise, when Malvolio begs for light, the playgoer sees all too vividly Malvolio's sufferings; thus "our laughter acquires an edge of distaste" (Leggatt, 243). Melvin Seiden refers to Malvolio as "Shakespeare's comic Coriolanus," and he describes the scapegoating of Malvolio as "a cannibalistic affair" (114). Perhaps the critic who best expresses the queasiness one experiences when he realizes that in Twelfth Night the harmony is contrived is Clifford Leech, who states:

though the pleasure is keen and genuine, we are fractionally conscious that the formula is not quite right... On such occasions the moment comes when we look coldly on the merry-making and the good relationship and see the precariousness of our tolerance for one another... We feel... the pity of life's refusal even in this comedy to sort itself out with a uniformity of happiness. The play is the stronger for its sense of this impossibility (42, 46).

Harry Levin states that from Shakespeare's day forward it has been "recognized that the breadth and depth of his [Shakespeare's] appeal were based upon his prolific capacities for the discernment and the depiction of character" (Evans 23). According to Levin, we perceive Shakespeare's characters "less as old friends than as second selves" (23). One of the principal purposes of this paper is to provide a fresh look at our "second selves" as they appear in Twelfth Night.

Every character in Twelfth Night wears a mask, for as Joseph Summers suggests, "the assumption of the play is that no one is without
a mask in the serio-comic business of the pursuit of happiness" (25). Shakespeare certainly was aware that the man behind the mask was just as interested in hiding from himself as in hiding from others—perhaps even more so.

In an attempt to reach our own conclusions concerning the main characters of Twelfth Night, we will summon each of the players into the spotlight, where we will unmask them one by one. First to appear on stage will be the lovers, followed by the comics, and finally the losers. As each character makes his or her appearance, he or she will be invited to deliver a line from Twelfth Night which seems especially appropriate for the interpretation of his or her characterization.

The Lovers

Orsino, Duke of Illyria: "For such as I am, all true lovers are . . ." (2.4). One wonders if with this declaration Shakespeare was enjoying a laugh at the expense of lovers everywhere. Orsino's exaggerated pangs of melancholy engender amusement rather than sympathy, for the audience knows that Orsino is in love with love rather than with Olivia. Despite Orsino's melancholic pose, he is enjoying himself immensely. The Duke is like a confirmed bachelor who, not wanting to change his bachelor state, manages to fall in love with a woman who is unavailable insofar as matrimony is concerned. Perhaps the most unflattering view of Orsino is presented by Bertrand Evans, who describes Orsino as standing "naked to laughter—a foolish plight for a hero . . . and a brutally ludicrous representation of romantic masculinity" (124). While it is true that we smile at Orsino's melancholic indulgence, we are unable to write him off as a fool, because we see reflected in his indulgence glimpses of our own; therefore, we forgive him his trespasses as we hope others will forgive us ours. It would be most uncharitable to view Orsino as ludicrous after he has bared his soul to us, as indicated by his confession to Viola: "I have unclasp'd / To thee the book even of my secret soul" (1.4). Thus, to laugh at him under those privileged circumstances would appear to be as unseemly as the laughter of a priest in response to a believer's confession. We can even forgive Orsino's chauvinistic speech: "There is no woman's sides / Can bide the beating of so strong a passion / As love doth give my heart; no woman's heart / So big, to hold so much; they lack retention" (2.4); for the Duke believes he is speaking to another male. Consequently, we dismiss his remarks as merely male-to-male bravura. In short, our estimation of Orsino—judging both from his actions in Twelfth Night and the reports given of him by the other characters in the play—corresponds with that of the Sea Captain's commendation of the Duke to Viola: "A noble duke, in nature as in name" (2.2).

The Countess Olivia: "Nor wit nor reason can my passion hide . . . Love sought is good, but given unsought is better" (3.2). Olivia's station and circumstances permit her a freedom that most women of her day would have envied. Not having a father or a brother as guardian, she completely controls her large household and is responsible to no one. Small wonder that she apparently uses as an excuse to continue her autonomy a seven-year period of mourning for her brother. Matrimony would have meant relinquishing her fortune and her freedom. Although Olivia's exaggerated indulgence in grief has been regarded by at least
one critic as an "abnormality" (Nagarajan 64), it seems conceivable that her display of grief is simply the ploy of an intelligent woman to attain her ends without hazarding the Duke's displeasure or inviting his wrath.

Olivia's attempt to maintain a sober facade between herself and the world is a formidable task, in that she is more inclined toward mirthfulness than toward mournfulness. She appreciates Feste's humor, just as her father earlier had enjoyed his Clown; she exhibits a joie de vivre similar to that of her Uncle Toby's, but hers is more contained. Olivia is far from being a stock character. She is quite aware of her station in Illyria, yet when she falls in love with Viola disguised as Cesario, she is ready to overlook Cesario's modest circumstances. Since Olivia does not have parents to see that she makes a "suitable" marriage, she acts on her own behalf. Twice during their initial meeting, Olivia asks of Cesario, "What is your parentage?" (1.5) and each time Cesario replies, "Above my fortunes, yet my state is well" (1.5). Olivia's sober facade falls as her fascination for Cesario rises. When at Cesario's request she casts aside her veil, she coyly asks: "Is't not well done?" (1.5). Cesario's response to Olivia's question is one of the most bitingly funny lines in all of Shakespeare: "Excellently done, if God did all" (1.5). And yet Olivia is secure enough not to be offended by such a remark. Olivia's soul is open to the same kind of scrutiny as is her face, and she passes that test just as admirably. She has no need for guile. Although she is guileless, she is not naive. In her determination to win Cesario, Olivia muses, "Youth is bought more often than begg'd or borrow'd" (3.4). She is willing to venture everything for love, as observable in her confession to Cesario: "A fiend like you might bear my soul to hell" (3.4).

Olivia is unfailingly kind to the members of her household—a motley crew, to be sure. She manages most of the time to close her eyes to her uncle Toby's excesses and to his adleapled houseguests such as Sir Andrew; she laughs at Feste's humor even when she is well aware that the joke is on her; and when she is led to believe that her steward Malvolio has become mentally deranged, she is saddened and declares: "Let some of my people have a special care of him. I would not have him miscarry [come to harm] for the half of my dowry" (3.4). Despite the fact that the audience sees Olivia unknowingly fall in love with a woman, we are unable to laugh at her predicament. How could anyone laugh at such a remarkable creature? We can enjoy the humor inherent in the situation itself, without necessarily viewing Olivia as an unenlightened dupe.

Viola: "I am not that I play" (1.5). Viola's role-playing complicates her life considerably. Disguised as a young man (Cesario), she seeks refuge from a tragedy at sea. When she reaches land and learns that the ruler of Illyria is Duke Orsino, she remembers having heard her late father speak well of him, and she recalls that Orsino had then been a bachelor. Not unhappy to learn that Orsino is still unmarried, she goes to him for employment and subsequently falls in love with him while acting as his love courier to Olivia. As if that were not complicated enough, Olivia subsequently falls in love with "Cesario." Remarkably, Viola maintains a strong sense of identity while floundering in an endless sea of troubles. She is a survivor in that she swims with the tide, but she is well aware that her fate does not
solely depend on her own ingenuity. Viewing the hazards which surround her, she exclaims, "O time, thou must untangle this, not I, / It is too hard a knot for me t' untie" (2.2). If this were the only side of Viola which Shakespeare allowed us to see, we would not be as enchanted by her as we are. In addition to her bravery, for example, she has a delightful sense of humor. When Feste receives a handout from Cesario, Feste blesses "him" by imploring Jove to send Cesario a beard. In an aside Cesario finishes the statement "I am almost sick for one" by adding "though I would not have it grow on my chin" (3.1).

Viola sympathizes with all those who are deceived by appearances, but is herself not easily deceived. For instance, she recognizes immediately that Feste the fool is no fool: "This fellow is wise enough to play the fool, / And to do that well craves a kind of wit" (3.1). Summers emphasizes Viola's skill in penetrating the disguises of her fellow characters in Twelfth Night when he says, "She cuts through the subterfuges and disguises of the others with absolute clarity" (29). Viola never forgets that she is merely playing a role, and she never loses her hold on reality.

Sebastian: "Or I am mad, or else this is a dream. / Let fancy still my sense in Lethe steep; / If it be this to dream, still let me sleep!" (4.1). According to Salingar, Shakespeare "reverted to Plautus for Sebastian, sometimes drawing on his own elaborations in The Comedy of Errors, but mainly going back directly to the original" (128). Sebastian is the last of the lovers of Twelfth Night to step forward and be unmasked. Although Sir Toby Belch and Maria are married at the end of the play, they are members of the comic ensemble and will appear on stage with that group.

Sebastian is more skilled in sword-play than is his twin sister Viola, but she is more skilled in word-play. Too, Sebastian lacks Viola's ability to judge others accurately; for example, Viola readily recognizes that Feste is no fool; but Sebastian declares: "I prithee, foolish Greek, depart from me" (4.1). Although Sebastian does not figure as prominently in the plot of Twelfth Night as Viola, his appearance in Illyria is most propitious. Remarkably similar in appearance to his sister, Sebastian is mistaken for Cesario by Olivia and the members of her household; consequently, he is caught up in a vortex of intrigue which perplexes and gratifies him. In both instances, his incredulity provides a source of mirth for the audience of Twelfth Night. It is not often that a stranger arrives in a city where straightforward he is accosted by swordsmen who challenge him and by a beautiful Countess who banishes his enemies and declares her wish to marry him. It is not surprising that Sebastian wonders if he is mad or dreaming.

While it is true that Shakespeare evidently uses Sebastian as a deus ex machina (Draper 157), it is certainly an indication of Shakespeare's growing comic ingenuity that Sebastian's role is much broader in scope than the term deus ex machina suggests: in addition to unravelling the knots referred to earlier by Viola, Sebastian contributes to the comedy of Twelfth Night. Sebastian's haste in following the strange, beautiful woman (Olivia) is a comic plot in itself. Additionally, he is an admirable foil to Malvolio. Whereas Malvolio vehemently protests that he is not mad and tries to escape his
confinement, Sebastian, intrigued by what he thinks is an illusion, willingly surrenders himself to it.

The four lovers who have just left the stage are similar in that they are in love, but their approach to love and life is quite different. Using Orsino, Olivia, Viola, and Sebastian as his subjects, Shakespeare painted a group of lovers. His enviable artistry is apparent when one notices that each individual in that group is distinctly different. Olivia's and Viola's love seems deeper than either Orsino's or Sebastian's. This impression seems unavoidable, when one notices Orsino turn from one woman to embrace another (apparently, the Duke has decided that the day is perfect for a wedding, and fortunately for Viola, she is in the right place at the right time), and Sebastian unhesitatingly agrees to marry a woman he has never seen before simply because she is lovely and she asked him to marry her. Olivia's impetuosity in love contrasts well with Viola's "time biding." With these four lovers, Shakespeare showed there were many paths to love. Holding hands and singing as they left the stage, the lovers considerably lightened the atmosphere surrounding Illyria. Knowing that the comics were backstage awaiting their cue, the lovers promised to send them onstage.

The Comics

Sir Toby Belch: "Dost thou think because thou are virtuous there shall be no more cakes and ale?" (2.3). The Lord of Misrule is the first of the comics to appear for the unmasking. That he should be first onstage is in character for the gregarious Sir Toby. Libertines usually make good copy, and Sir Toby Belch is far from being an exception to the rule. His speech is delightfully roguish—often startlingly profane—and he is the perfect Lord of Misrule for Twelfth Night. Who is there who would dispute his "I am sure care's an enemy of life" (1.3), or who would fail to applaud the pregnant question he addresses to Malvolio: "Dost thou think, because thou art virtuous there shall be no more cakes and ale?" (2.3) It is doubtful that a better-phrased question has ever been asked of a self-righteous hypocrite. No wonder Sir Toby dislikes Malvolio, a character who takes himself so seriously. The dislike is more than a little tinged with fear that the steward can, in fact, rule and that there will be no more cakes and ale in Olivia's household for spongers. Malvolio, Sir Toby's natural enemy, warns Sir Toby, "My lady bade me tell you . . . if you can separate yourself and your misdemeanors, you are welcome to the house; if not . . . she is very willing to bid you farewell" (2.3). Sir Toby is alarmed even though he tries not to reveal it.

Sir Toby is a likeable rogue, but rogue he is. He offers an altruistic rationalization for his constant imbibing: "I'll drink to her [Olivia] as long as there is a passage in my throat, and drink in Illyria" (1.3). Of course, it never occurs to Sir Toby to question the propriety of depleting Olivia's wine cellar in order to drink toasts to her health, while his wine-induced boisterousness prevents her from sleeping. And even though Sir Toby recognizes that his (and therefore, Olivia's) houseguest, Sir Andrew Aguecheek, is a fool, he countenances Aguecheek's company—both because he owes Sir Andrew money and because he expects to inveigle still more money out of him. Sir Toby's philosophy is hedonistic, and his strategy is avoidance of any obstacles.
to his various pursuits. He exemplifies the kind of holiday abandon which existed during Epiphany in Shakespeare's day.

The fact that Shakespeare assigned to Sir Toby more lines than to any other character in Twelfth Night seems sufficient evidence of Sir Toby's importance in the view of his creator. Inevitably, critics compare Sir Toby with another rotund Shakespearean character: Sir John Falstaff. C.L. Barber suggests that while Falstaff "makes a career of misrule," Sir Toby "uses misrule to show up a careerist" (32). Both rogues inspire laughter, but they are far from being from the same fabric. Sir John is politically ambitious, and he tries to "hitch his wagon to a royal star," but Prince Hal cuts loose his old comrade's wagon and watches it careen back down the hill. Sir Toby's horizons are more limited than Sir John's. Sir Toby is happy just as long as Olivia provides him with plenty of cakes and ale and an abode. And, since Sir Toby is family, it is unlikely that he would ever receive the treatment from Olivia which Sir John received from his old drinking buddy. Despite their many differences, however, they are both indomitable: both leave the stage with a bloody but unbowed head.

Sir Andrew Aguecheek: "Will you make an ass o' me?" (3.11) Next to appear on stage is Sir Andrew, as he steps out of Sir Toby's shadow and into the spotlight. Only a fool would ask, "will you make an ass o'me," and Sir Andrew proves he is worthy of that epitaph. Throughout Twelfth Night Sir Toby not only makes an ass of Sir Andrew, but at one point he manages to steal his horse as well. Sir Andrew is one-half of a comic pair; the other half is his host-tormentor, Sir Toby. Sir Andrew, "oafish squire," and Sir Toby, "degenerate knight" (Salinger 134), prey on each other, but the brighter Sir Toby always manages to maintain the upper hand. While the usual reaction toward Sir Andrew is to laugh at him occasionally his comments convey a touch of poignancy. For instance, when Sir Toby boasts of Maria's adoration of him, Sir Andrew muses, "I was ador'd once too" (2.3), whereupon Sir Toby callously advises Sir Andrew to send for more money. The Freudian association between Sir Andrew's mentioning his need for love (indirectly, that is) and Sir Toby's responding by ordering his gull to send for more money seems blatant to a twentieth-century observer, even though Shakespeare antedated Freud by a few hundred years. Today, Sir Toby's reply to Sir Andrew would be called a Freudian slip.

Feste: "Look then to be well edified when the fool delivers the madman" (5.1). Feste belongs to the Fool tradition which began in the Middle Ages. This tradition, according to Draper, viewed the world as topsy-turvy, and all society as fools, except the fool" (211). Feste is the last of the comics of Twelfth Night to appear on the stage for unmasking, and his appearance is heralded by the jingle of the bells on his hat. The brilliance of his apparel is more than matched by that of his wit, and the observer quickly agrees with Feste's boast that this fool does not wear motley in his brain. Feste is closely related to Touchstone, the wise fool of As You Like It, but Feste's talents are more diverse and more impressive. Touchstone is a clever jester, whereas Feste is more a clever fool. Feste's pronouncements are not forgotten following the chain-reaction laughter; they remain semi-dormant until, triggered by a later incident, they explode in one's consciousness. For example, Feste's "nothing that is so is so" (4.1)
not only aptly describes in fewer than ten words the play but correspondingly, and more significantly, life itself.

Shakespeare's fools--Touchstone, Feste, Lavache, and King Lear's Fool--are highly individualized. The first three are usually regarded as being artificial rather than natural fools. No prototype of Feste appears in any of Twelfth Night's known sources, and Shakespeare is believed to have created the role especially for Robert Armin, a professional court fool as well as a stage fool. The role is purported to have been the first portrayal of a court fool in Elizabethan drama (Draper 195).

Feste literally sings for his supper, and his combination of wit and song unfailingly provides him with a feast fit for a fool--a court fool, that is. Although Feste probably has a wife (if one accepts Feste's closing song as biographical), he always appears in Twelfth Night as a loner--almost as if he has to depend on scraps from other people's lives to provide his sustenance. This kind of pathos does not appear in Touchstone, for it would clearly be out of place in As You Like It's Forest of Arden. Such pathos is, however, most appropriate in Illyria. Feste clearly deserves John Dover Wilson's designation as "the subtlest of all fools" (Bergeron 49). Illyria needs a fool subtle enough to deliver the madman and, in Feste, Shakespeare has provided the quintessential subtle fool.

In Twelfth Night Shakespeare provides a kaleidoscopic view of comedy that has not been excelled. The comic spectrum in Twelfth Night ranges from the pale Sir Andrew Aguecheek to the vividly colored Feste, and it extends from farcical or pedestrian humor (as exemplified by Sir Toby, Sir Andrew, Fabian, and Maria) to the brilliantly wise, subtle humor exemplified by Feste. The distinction between the comic figures is just as finely drawn as that between the lovers. Sir Andrew never rises above the foolish, and Sir Toby never ascends above the alcoholic haze in which he stays suspended above Time itself. Sir Toby's humor has a sharp edge to it and is more subtle than that of Sir Andrew's, but Sir Toby's humor is quite blatant when compared to that of Feste's. The three main comic figures in Twelfth Night are different not only in their brand of humor but also in their bearing and in their outlook on life. In Twelfth Night all of these differences are richly displayed.

The Losers

Malvolio: "To be Count Malvolio!" (2.5) The two losers in Twelfth Night are Malvolio and Sebastian's friend, Antonio. Malvolio appears first for the unmasking. Underneath the mask he is wearing his habitual scowl; he is noticeably impatient to get this ceremony over with so that he can return to his duties as Olivia's steward. Malvolio has no time for what he considers to be foolishness, as exemplified by Feste, or for riotous behavior, as exemplified by Sir Toby, but there is no evidence that he wishes them harm.

Malvolio's pomposity contributes to his being the superb comic butt which Shakespeare evidently intended him to be. When Shakespeare allows the audience to glimpse a Malvolio who believes himself to be alone, we see the swagger contained in the steward's soliloquy, and that kind of swaggering in words is even more amusing than the swagger of his gait.
On the other hand, however, it is precisely Malvolio's seriousness and his undivided devotion to duty which equip him to be the complete steward which Olivia needs.

Nevertheless, even Malvolio is vulnerable to daydreams. He dreams of being "Count Malvolio," of the rich dressing gowns he will have, and of the pleasure he will derive from ordering Sir Toby to desist from his drunkenness. Olivia's serving-woman, Maria, is aware of this weakness of Malvolio's and on it she bases the success of her plot against the steward. One feels compassion for Malvolio as the steward reads in the forged love letter, "Some are born great, some achieve greatness, and some have greatness thrust upon 'em" (2.5), and again later when the ebullient Malvolio declares: "Nothing that can be can come between me and the full prospect of my hopes. Well, Jove, not I, is the doer of this, and he is to be thank'd" (3.4). Lines such as these do not lend support to J. B. Priestly's claim that "Shakespeare clearly disliked Malvolio" (Draper 88). Neither does Olivia's line at the end of Twelfth Night support such a claim: "He hath been notoriously abus'd" (5.1). Malvolio's punishment—being proclaimed a madman and thrown into a dark room—far outweighs his offenses, and one is inclined to agree with Malvolio's conclusion that "never was man thus wrong'd" (4.2).

Antonio: "I am skillless in these parts; which to a stranger, / Unguided and unfriended, often prove / Rough and unhospitable" (3.3). The last of the losers and the last character to participate in this unmasking ceremony is Antonio. It is he who harbored Sebastian following the shipwreck in which the twins were separated, and it is he who followed Sebastian into Illyria at considerable risk to his own safety. A disguise is more crucial for Antonio than for anyone else in Twelfth Night, because he is considered an enemy by many Illyrians. The kind Antonio is reminiscent of Bassanio's friend of the same name in The Merchant of Venice. Just as Antonio risks his life for Bassanio, the Antonio of Twelfth Night risks his life for Sebastian. In both instances the would-be saviors are left standing alone in the crowd while their friends repeat their wedding vows. It is in this sense that Antonio of Twelfth Night is a loser.

The losers in Twelfth Night both become disillusioned with mankind. Malvolio's maltreatment by his fellow Illyrians is with malice aforethought. His arrogant, self-righteous attitude leads to his being used as a scapegoat. Antonio, on the other hand, is wholly admirable, and he does not deserve the misfortunes which befall him in Illyria. Both losers in Twelfth Night are called mad. Madness is the charge brought against Malvolio in order to imprison him, and the officer who arrests Antonio declares, "The man grows mad, away with him!"—(3.4) Both losers are businessmen, both are devoted to their principles, and both stand outside the world of courtly love. Salingar's statement concerning Antonio applies equally as well to Malvolio: "Precisely because he takes himself so seriously, he helps to keep the comic balance of the play" (132).

Shakespeare's treatment and elaboration of old themes in Twelfth Night—mistaken identity, appearance versus reality, time out of joint, melancholy, love, ambition, greed, madness, fools—is truly awe-inspiring. Twelfth Night's musical quality deserves considerable credit for the tremendous success of the play. Twelfth Night often has
been compared to an opera. Northrop Frye calls Figaro and The Magic Flute "the most strikingly modern parallels to Twelfth Night" (25). In Twelfth Night Shakespeare develops his themes in much the same manner as a musical conductor uses musical variations to express and give body to a theme. Shakespeare's choice of a musical Fool for Twelfth Night was not made without forethought. The playwright's orchestration of Twelfth Night is admirably conducted by his chosen impresario: Feste. What better representative for a musically-celebrated Feast of Fools than the quintessential fool, Feste? Even his name suggests the spirit of the occasion. Just as the title Twelfth Night symbolizes both festivity and an end to festivity, Feste by his name advocates festivity, but in his jests and songs he reminds the celebrants of Twelfth Night that reality soon will banish the festival-fostered illusions—that Time (which has been suspended for the duration of the celebration) will intrude and once again make its presence felt. Feste warns Olivia that "beauty is a flower" (1.4), and in a song he reminds his audience that "youth's a stuff will not endure" (2.2). Feste later voices this message concerning Time's relentless march to Orsino, but he couches his warning to the Duke in more guarded words. Feste invokes the god of melancholy's protection of Orsino as the Duke makes "a good voyage of nothing" (2.4). In Feste Shakespeare has created not just a witty fool, but a fool who is both witty and wise.

At the conclusion of Twelfth Night the transition from the world of illusion to the real world is made less painful by Feste's music. Significantly, it is Feste who brings the play to an end. His ditty suggests that perhaps there is nothing new under the sun, and that as in a madhouse, very little matters after all. As the final strains of Twelfth Night's music are heard, one has the uncanny feeling that he is a member of a select audience, all of whom have been enchanted by a skillful conductor, who has allowed him—in fact, led him—into the world of carnival. With the ringing down of the curtain, one is back in the real world, confronted by the responsibility of recognizing and living with the madness which ever surrounds him.¹

NOTES

¹This paper, excerpted from the writer's master's thesis, CHARACTER AND THEME IN TWELFTH NIGHT, was addressed to the Joseph E. Martin Shakespeare Circle, Jackson, Tennessee, September 18, 1980.
WORKS CITED


FROST'S VERSION OF A CHAUCERIAN PILGRIM
by Louise Bentley

On the 600th anniversary of Chaucer's legendary journey of the pilgrims to Canterbury the motif of the traveler is still a constant. Robert Frost wrote of a preacher-pilgrim encounter in a dramatic dialogue called "Snow," published first in Poetry magazine in 1916 (Thompson 542) and then in his own volume Mountain Interval the same year. When it won the magazine's prize of $100.00 in 1917, his telegram to Harriet Monroe called the poem his "first real prize in a long life" (Frost, Selected Letters 222). The poem, showing Frost's superb conversational style that led to enduring fame, offers a unique twentieth-century pilgrim akin to Chaucer's motley group.

Although the journey motif is as old as literature itself, Frost focuses on one pilgrim in "Snow" (Frost, Poetry 143-156) that refutes stereotypes and offers a fresh approach to the pilgrim's journey. The encounter of a New England couple awakened at midnight by this preacher-pilgrim seeking relief from the snowstorm offers several surprises. Meserve, the preacher of a small Racker sect, has spent three hours to come four miles after preaching in town. Now at Fred and Helen Cole's house, he wants to call his wife before going the last three miles home. He also wants to give his horses a rest. From the telephone conversation it is clear that Lett, his wife, begs him to stay the rest of the night with the Coles, but he asks, "What's the sense?" He assures her, "My dear, I'm coming just the same" (143). When he returns to the barn to check the horses, the Coles discuss their midnight visitor.

It is quickly evident that Helen thinks Meserve a "pious scalawag" who has no business out on such a night. She had heard enough to decide: "I detest the thought of him--/With his ten children under ten years old./I hate his wretched little Racker sect" (144). Her immediate prejudice and dislike may coincide with the typical fourteenth-century perception of friars in Chaucer's day. "No matter how gifted they were as preachers and lecturers," Maurice Hussey thinks their public image was "a scandal" (67). These "begging friars were spread upon the country districts like a plague of locusts" (French 39). Chaucer satirizes them in his pilgrim-friar Hubert in the General Prologue to The Canterbury Tales (25-26) as well as in Hubert's libelous fabliaux he tells on the journey (310-322). Helen seems to put Meserve in such a category and shows disgust at his off-brand religion; at least the fourteenth-century friar had the prestige of the official church.

Yet she is afraid to let him leave for fear he will freeze in a snowbank. She empathizes with another woman she does not know because that woman certainly needs Meserve. She decides that Meserve cannot go back into the storm that night; she will convince him to stay. Fred, her husband, amused at both his wife's irritation and her sudden concern, is intrigued with the tough little man. He tells Helen:

Only you women have to put these airs on
To impress men. You've got us so ashamed
Of being men we can't look at a good fight
Between two boys and not feel bound to stop it (146).
He thinks Meserve should do as he wishes. Fred teases Helen about saving the life of this savior of men's souls and urges: "Stick to him, Helen. Make him answer you."

The poem's conflicts involve the feminine and masculine responses to danger. In the beginning of the poem it appears that the Coles and Meserve's wife are opposed to Meserve's traveling further; soon, however, Fred sides with Meserve in challenging the snowstorm. Fred, appearing to side with Helen and urging Meserve to stay, is basically daring Meserve on. Both women, Helen and Meserve's wife, appear as the practical realists in their fear of the storm; both men appear as idealistic and sure of conquering the snow's fury.

"Meserve," a name Frost probably coined for "Me Serve," is "strong of stale tobacco" and full of surprises that refute Helen's misconceptions. Cold and weary from his three-hour fight, he still sees the snow's beauty and majesty: "You can just see it glancing off the roof / Making a great scroll upward toward the sky / Long enough for recording all our names on--" (143). Such a sight others would gladly ignore at midnight. Frost has carefully made Meserve's language plausible and allusive to his ministerial calling, although Helen is surprised that Meserve never once talks of God, as she expects.

Another surprise about this stranger, tough and strong, is his sensitivity and perception. Before he calls home he decides, "I'll call her softly so that if she's wise / And gone to sleep, she needn't wake to answer." To his wife he explains, "I called you up to say Good-night from here / Before I went to say Good-morning there." She begs him to stay, but he insists,

'My dear, I'm coming just the same. I didn't
Call you to ask you to invite me home.'--
He lingered for some word she wouldn't say,
Said it at last himself, 'Good-night' (143):

Another surprise for the Coles about this midnight pilgrim when he returns from checking his horses in the barn is his talking and philosophizing in their warm room. He ignores Helen's question, "What did your wife say on the telephone?" and talks instead about what he sees in the room. He is intrigued with the leaf in her open book that stands and "can't turn either way." His monologue insists quite pointedly that "Our very life depends on everything's / Recurring till we answer from within" (147). Is this some subtle persuasion he is using for himself?

What to Helen is reason for staying--the depth of snow already accumulated--is perceived differently by Meserve. He tells a story about a boy who lived down "at the Averys' one winter" and banked their house with snow for additional warmth. Meserve admits that he likes the snow better from inside where he is warm than he will "out in it." He is loquacious and visionary as he ponders the sound and velocity of the wind; yet he determines to go on that night. With the assurance that "Our snowstorms as a rule / Aren't looked on as man-killers" (150), he ignores Helen's common-sense arguments to stay. With a Biblical hint he reminds them: "Yet think of the small birds at roost and not / In nests. Shall I be counted less than they are?" He insists it is the
storm itself "That wants me as a war might if it came"; he leaves without once mentioning God as Helen had been expecting. Meserve, accepting Fred's dare, leaves telling Helen to "Ask any man" for explanation (151). This technique of Frost resides in many poems such as the enigma in "There are Roughly Zones": "What comes over a man, is it soul or mind-- / That to no limits and bounds he can stay confined?" (305).

Morris P. Tilley recalls Frost's comments to him about "Snow":

I have three characters speaking in one poem, and I was not satisfied with what they said until I got them to speak so true to their characters that no mistake could be made as to who was speaking. I would never put the names of the speakers in front of what they said. They would have to tell that by the truth to the character of what they said. It would be interesting to try to write a play with ten characters and not have any names before what they said (Tilley 23)

As the reader confronts the lines of this poem, he can be quite sure of the speaker, whether Helen, Fred, or Meserve. Frost's success was based on getting what he called "the tone of speech far more subtle and penetrating than dialect" (Gould 199). His professional pride was ruffled at Amy Lowell's accusation in Tendencies in Modern American Poetry that he had "no ear" for New Englanders' "peculiar tongue" (Gould 198). Ironically, the National Institute of Arts and Letters, late in December of 1917, awarded Frost the Russell Lories Prize for the "longest, most conversational of his talk-poems, 'Snow,' resonant with the speech-tones of New England" (Gould 200).

The poem, however, does not end with Meserve's leaving. Deciding they can be no help by sitting and "living his fight through with him," the Coles go to bed about 1:00 A.M. After 3:00 A.M. the telephone awakens Fred. Meserve is not home, and Lett's angry voice questions Fred. "Why did you let him go?" (153). When Helen goes to the phone and gets no answer, she decides Lett has left it off the hook. Intensity builds as Fred and Helen take turns listening and imagining. Helen says, "I hear an empty room-- / . . . I hear a clock--and windows rattling" (153). Fred is amused at his wife's fears; after a little banter, he says in "quiet jest," "You can't hear whether she has left the door / Wide open and the wind's blown out the lamp / And the fire's died and the room's dark and cold?" Then Fred listens: "A baby's crying!" Alarm builds: "Frantic it sounds, though muffled and far off. / Its mother wouldn't let it cry like that, / Not if she's there" (154). Eventually comes the "chirp" of the phone bell. Meserve's voice announces his safe arrival and explains that his wife had gone to let him in the barn. Relieved, Fred answers, "We're glad. Drop in and see us when you're passing" (155).

The concluding repartee between Helen and Fred analyzes the incident. She thinks the "whole to do seems to have been for nothing." She is irritated at having provided a "halfway coffee house 'twixt town and nowhere--" and frustrated at having her advice ignored. What good was it to be friendly with this preacher-pilgrim who refused her help? "What kind of a man / Do you call that?" Fred decides: "But let's
forgive him. / We've had a share in one night of his life. / What'll you bet he ever calls again?" (156). The humorous dare Cole gave Meserve is now for Helen.

This couple, disturbed in the middle of the night, manifest true neighborliness, what Thompson calls a "love in action" (Fire and Ice 214) that ignores the cold and loss of sleep. Helen and Fred are unsatisfied by the encounter, however, because as Frost says in "Revelation," their "light words" to Meserve merely "teased" him back into the storm. They understand well that

We make ourselves a place apart
Behind light words that tease and flout,
But oh, the agitated heart
Till someone really finds us out (19).

Meserve will probably not stop again or attempt to develop a friendship with the Coles. He seems almost oblivious to their inconvenience. It may be that his are the teasing words that leave the Coles mystified about this strange pilgrim.

Because of its conflict and suspense, "Snow" has also been performed successfully as a one-act play. It makes tense drama with its 349 lines of direct discourse as opposed to only 26 lines of narration. Robert Newdick, however, notes that the beauty of the opening lines would have to be lost in stage directions (86-87). "The three stood listening to a fresh access / Of wind that caught against the house a moment, / Gulpèd snow, and then blew free again" (143)--these incorporate too much to be omitted. The poem had its genesis at a neighbor's farmhouse kitchen table in January, 1916, when Frost stopped by on one of his wintry walks. After hearing a graphic account of one such minister his neighbor had helped, Frost walked home with the "subconscious flow of pre-thought crystallizing into poetic idea."

When he finished the poem a few weeks later, "he felt it was a high point in vocal creativity" (Gould 177). The reader of the dialogue has the double pleasure of both dramatic intensity and unforgettable narration.

In this midnight visit Frost has reversed the normal pattern of the pilgrim seeking a religious goal. Meserve has met the religious task of preaching in town to his small group; his pilgrimage is the adventure of braving the blizzard for home. The Coles initially have little respect for this itinerant preacher; yet they are amazed at his sensitivity, at his not "dragging God" into his visit, at his philosophizing and creatively posing questions, at this man who actually enjoys nature's wrath. A man who might be thought of as longwinded, ridiculous, or boring is none of these things. He is admirable in that he breaks into a rather negative atmosphere and leaves a more positive impression. Their stereotypes of an ignorant, sloven, backwoods' preacher change. What irritates Helen causes admiration in Fred; what she sees as danger, Meserve sees as challenge. Arthur M. Sampley believes Meserve asserted his manhood in braving the storm again because he felt Fred "had a contemptuous attitude toward his offbrand religious views" (194). This pilgrim reveals more of himself in an hour than they "had seeing him pass by in the road / A thousand times." He so overwhelms them that even Helen calls him "Brother Meserve" without realizing it. When he
leaves they suggest, "It's quiet as an empty church without him" (152). Perhaps part of their surprise is that Meserve has in reality come closer to the picture of Chaucer's Parson, a much admired man of God on his way to Canterbury. He is known as one whose "business was to show a fair behavior / And draw men then to Heaven and the Saviour." That famous encomium Chaucer gives him is "That first he wrought, and afterwards he taught" (32-33), shames the friar.

This dialogue is a study of character--insight into a stereotype and changed views of human beings through the subtle interplay of conversation. Fred and Helen learn about themselves as well as Meserve in the almost ludicrous interruptions of a winter night. The surprises Meserve offers in his explanations and story force the listeners to different ideas. What one discovers about another shifts perceptions and changes relationships. John Robert Doyle, Jr., reminds us that "human relationships are seldom solemn. As Frost inspects human thought, speech, and action he constantly finds what must be called humor. In this respect he regularly reminds one of Chaucer, who never looked at human behavior without seeing its humorous aspects" (92). The dialogue "Snow" includes many of the same elements that made Chaucer's pilgrims headed to Canterbury so lively and rambunctious. Frost's preacher-pilgrim Meserve would have enjoyed both the trip and the company!

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PRUDENCE, PLAISANCE, PUISSANCE: THE JUDGMENT OF PARIS FROM
GUIDO DELLE COLONNE TO JEAN LEMAIRE DE BELGES
by Judy Kem

In the prologue to the first book of the Illustrations de Gaule et singularitez de Troye (1509-1511), Jean Lemaire de Belges presents his reasons for writing a new version of the Trojan legend. The most pressing of these is to correct certain bad writers ("mauvais escrivains") (I, 4) whose works have served as models for the tapestries and paintings of the Burgundian court. Lemaire only mentions one of these "bad writers" by name--Guido delle Colonne (I, 127). According to Lemaire, Guido, and others like him, made many mistakes ("il ha souvent failli") and misinterpreted the legend. They did not realize that the Judgment of Paris held the key to understanding the Trojan history ("esclaircissement de toute l'histoire Troyenne"). It is up to Lemaire to interpret the legend which he describes as "true and fertile, and rich in great mysteries and poetic and philosophical knowledge, containing profitable matter ("fructueuse substance") under the surface of artificial fables" (I, 4).

To better understand how Lemaire's version differs from those that preceded it as well as what he objected to in Guido's account, one must first examine briefly the versions of his predecessors, among whom are Homer (of course), Virgil, Ovid, Dares the Phrygian, Apuleius, Fulgentius, Benoit de Sainte-Maure, and Boccaccio. Homer's adapters all added to the Trojan legend, but the story of the Judgment of Paris has been greatly expanded.

Homer (c. 850 B.C.) only briefly mentions Paris' Judgment in the final chapter of the Iliad: "Paris fell into the fatal error of humiliating the goddesses at their audience in his shepherd's hut by his preference for the third, who offered him the pleasures and the penalties of love" (XXIV). The three goddesses are Here, Athene, and Aphrodite. Paris chose Aphrodite, the goddess of love as the most beautiful. He "humiliaded" Athene, or Pallas Athene, the goddess of wisdom and patroness of the arts and crafts, and Here, the goddess of motherhood. Virgil (c. 70-19 B.C.) too only mentions the Judgment of Paris in the Aeneid (I, 27; II, 602), while Ovid refers to it stet but more frequently in three letters of the Heroides (V, XVI, XVII).

However, Dares the Phrygian devotes even greater attention to the tale. Dares, a supposed eye-witness to the Trojan war who fought on the Trojan side, claimed to antedate Homer in the Latin translation of a Greek account, (Daretis Phrygii De Excidio Troiae Historia, ed. Ferdinand Meister, Leipzig, 1873), which was probably written in the first century A.D. Dares presents the Judgment as a dream that Paris has on Mount Ida. Paris uses the dream to convince his father, Priam, to let him go on the expedition to Greece. In his speech, Paris relates that Mercury brought Minerva, Juno, and Venus to him to judge their beauty. Venus promised him that if he chose her as the most beautiful she would give him Helen, the loveliest woman in Greece. On hearing Venus' promise, Paris judged her the most beautiful. Dares adds that the dream inspired Priam with the hope that Venus would aid Paris, and for this reason he gave him permission to abduct Helen (The Trojan War: The Chronicles of Dictys of Crete and Dares the Phrygian, trans. by R.

Around 1160 A.D., Benoît de Sainte-Maure based his Roman de Troie upon the accounts of Dares and Dictys, another so-called eye-witness, and added little. In 1287, the Sicilian Guido delle Colonne, in turn, based his prose version Historia Destructionis Troiae on Benoît's Roman; Guido, though, cites Dictys and Dares as his sources but never mentions Benoît. Guido also presents the Judgment as a dream that Paris uses to convince his father to approve the plan to abduct Helen and hold her ransom for his sister Hesione. Again Mercury brings Venus, Pallas, and Juno to Paris to settle a dispute which arose when an apple was thrown among them at a feast. The apple of precious metal was engraved with an inscription in Greek letters which read "to be given to the most beautiful." Mercury tells Paris that each promises a reward if chosen, and this is where Guido adds to the account. Venus promises that he will carry away from Greece a very noble woman, more beautiful than herself, but Guido adds that Juno will make Paris the greatest among eminent men in the world and Pallas will give him human knowledge. Guido also adds that Paris requests that they undress, a detail that does not appear in the texts of Dares or Benoît but does appear in Ovid's Heroides; according to Guido, Paris then follows the "judgment of truth" by naming Venus "mistress of the apple." Upon hearing his decision, Venus confirms the promise related by Mercury (Historia, ed. Nathaniel Edward Griffin, Cambridge, 1936, VI, 62-63).

Unlike Guido, Lemaitre emphasizes the moral lesson of the tale. He appears to have based his account on that of Boccaccio (1313-1375), who in turn borrowed from Fulgentius (467-533 A.D.) and perhaps supplemented from Benoît. In De Genealogia deorum, Boccaccio, like Guido, recounts the story of the apple of discord thrown among the goddesses during a feast. Jupiter, having heard of Paris' great powers of judgment, hands the matter over to the young shepherd, who asks the three goddesses to undress. [(One of Boccaccio's contemporaries, Guillaume de Machaut (1300-1377), in his La Fontaine Amoureuse does not mention that the goddesses undress nor does the author of the Ovide moralisé, an early 14th-century work.)] Bypassing the intermediary of Mercury, who is not mentioned in Boccaccio's account, Pallas promises Paris that she will give him knowledge of all things while Juno promises him kingdoms and riches. However, he responds that Venus is the most beautiful and the apple is awarded to the goddess of love (Genealogie, Rpt. 1531; New York: Garland Publishing Co., 1976, V, 22).

Then Boccaccio quotes Fulgentius (467-533 A.D.), who outlines the threefold life of mankind. The first is meditative or contemplative, the second, practical or active, and the third, sensual or voluptuary. The first, Fulgentius states, concerns the search for truth, the second seeks advantages and possessions, and the third is a life of pleasure and lust. The poets, he adds, explain the Judgment of Paris in these terms. Minerva represents the contemplative life, Juno, the active life, and Venus, the life of pleasure. Boccaccio also refers to Aristotle who describes the threefold life in the first chapter of his Ethics. However, Boccaccio quotes Fulgentius as saying that man is endowed with free will which allows him to choose one of the three. Boccaccio explains that the story of the Judgment of Paris illustrates what happens to those who choose a life of pleasure. (And as Fulgentius
states in the second book of his Mythologies, "But the shepherd Paris... turned his snail's eyes towards lust..." (Fulgentius the Mythographer, Trans. Leslie George Whitbread, Ohio State UP, 1971, 65).

Although Lemaire follows Boccaccio's account very closely, he greatly expands upon it. He, like Boccaccio, describes a gathering of the gods at the wedding feast of Peleus and Thetis. The goddess Discord throws the golden apple among Juno, Pallas, and Minerva. Jupiter, according to Lemaire, does not want to decide who is the most beautiful of the three, so Mercury, the "god of eloquence and invention," leads the goddesses to Paris.

However, unlike Boccaccio, Lemaire describes in detail and at great length each of the three goddesses, who make speeches to convince Paris of their worthiness. Juno appears richly adorned as befits the representative of the active life, characterized by the pursuit of riches. She carries a sceptre in her hand denoting her regal power and is accompanied by peacocks (royal birds) and Iris or the rainbow (231-232). Pallas, the goddess of prudence and representative of the contemplative life, wears three rich vestments of different colors decorated with symbols of the seven liberal arts and the seven virtues. Lemaire explains that the three different robes denote that wisdom is hidden from the ignorant. She is also armed, denoting wisdom's ready defense, and decorated with such symbols as an owl, an olive branch, and the head of a Gorgon. Pallas wears a crystal shield and a long lance and has wings on her arms and heels (1, 236-237). Venus, the goddess of love and representative of the life of pleasure in this account, wears a flowing robe gathered at the waist by her belt, called "Ceston," which, Lemaire explains, she only wears at chaste, honest, and legitimate weddings. All weddings at which Venus does not wear her belt "Ceston" are called "inceste." She is accompanied by her son, Cupid, and her daughter, Voluptuousness ("Volupté"), as well as by the three Graces. Lemaire also emphasizes Venus' close relationship to the planet Venus by pointing out that she wears a carbuncle on her forehead denoting her bright planet, and he adds that her chariot denotes the course and velocity of her planet (I, 241-243). No doubt Lemaire described the goddesses in such detail so that his version of the legend might serve as a model for new, "corrected" tapestries and paintings of the Burgundian and French courts.

After each description, the goddesses present their cases to the young shepherd. As in the descriptions, the speeches reflect the type of life that the goddess represents. Juno (the active life) begins by offering Paris possessions and royal power. His actions, she promises, will bring him immortality through glory. She then attacks her two opponents. First, she condemns those who, in a "solitary contemplation" or in "philosophical dreams" spend their days in idleness. She also warns Paris that it is not seemly for a man who would pursue a royal vocation to delve so deeply into literature and to spend his time listing the definitions of prudence and the other moral virtues. She then condemns the life of pleasure by censuring those who follow the Epicurean doctrine (I, 233-236).

Pallas (the contemplative life), the goddess of wisdom, is next. She promises Paris that, if he chooses her, he will acquire knowledge of secret things, memory of past things, clear understanding of present
ones, and useful prevision of future ones. This conforms to Cicero's
definition of the cardinal virtue of prudence in De Inventione.
Prudence, according to Cicero, consists of three parts: memory
(knowledge of the past), intelligence (knowledge of the present), and
foresight (knowledge of future events). She also promises him clear
understanding of the mysteries of all divine and human sciences (I,
238-239).

Finally, it is Venus' turn. The goddess of love first recognizes
that Paris was almost persuaded by Pallas and the attractions of the
contemplative life ("j'appercôo que presques as este esbranle par
l'impulsion des undes Palladiennes") (246). In his description of the
goddess, Lemaire emphasized her close relationship to the planet Venus;
now, in her speech, Venus makes direct appeals to Paris' attraction to
her planet. She tells him that if he wishes to resist both the active
and the contemplative lives, he need only look toward her fertile
planet which, she reminds him, reigned in the sky at his birth and
consequently gave him an "unavoidable," venereal makeup ("complexion
totalement Venerienne et non evitoble") (I, 247)

Paris weakens at Venus' eloquence, but he does not as yet decide;
instead he requests that the goddesses undress. Venus must then remove
her belt, "Ceston," a significant fact which Lemaire does not fail to
emphasize (252). Paris, moved by "excessive lust" finally decides in
favor of Venus. To underline the moral message, Juno departs angrily
asking the young man: "Aren't you ashamed of preferring the useless and
voluptuous life to the active and contemplative ones?" ("Nas tu eu
honte de préférer la vie voluptueuse et inutile, à la vie active et
contemplative?") (I, 258).

After Juno's angry denunciation of Paris, Lemaire offers historical,
philosophical, and moral interpretations of the Judgment. The
historical interpretation is the gathering of the relatives of Thetis
and Peleus. Indeed, Lemaire seems convinced of the historical veracity
of the Trojan story.

For the "sens physical and moral interpretation" Lemaire adds that
the "noble poets" meant that the planet Venus dominated in Paris' birth
horoscope, making him susceptible to venereal things. According to
Lemaire, Paris gave the golden apple, symbolizing his head, to Venus,
choosing a life of pleasure and scorning the active life of Juno and the
contemplative life of Pallas. He asked to see them nude, symbolizing
his intelligence and power of imagination ("pource que son subtil engin
tes imagina par grand perspicacite et attention") (I, 272). Jupiter,
who did not want to decide, symbolizes God who gives man free will.
And, as Fulgentius states and Lemaire repeats, if God had condemned the
two other ways of life, he would have left man no choice.

Finally, Lemaire presents what he considers irrefutable proof of his
interpretation. The fate of Paris was caused by the influence of the
celestial bodies. He says that in the fifth book of Julius Firmicus'
Astrology, he found Paris' birth horoscope, which was in Aquarius,
with the sun in Leo, Libra in Scorpio, Saturn in Leo, Jupiter in
Aquarius, Mars in Scorpio, and Venus with Mercury in Gemini. According
to Firmicus, the conjunction of Venus and Mercury signified that those
born under such conditions would have problems in marriage and great
misfortune (malheurete) which would bring about a terrible, bloody war (I, 273).

Lemaire then adds a philosophical interpretation in relating that this Judgment was disputed in front of Saint Peter, the Apostle, which Clement of Alexandria (c. 150-211) describes in his Travels. Niceta, the philosopher, responded in the following manner. The banquet of the gods represented the situation of the stars and planets in the sky. There are six male and six female gods, which represent the twelve signs of the Zodiac. The meats of the banquet are the reasons and causes of things. And one can learn from this how the world is governed by the position of the stars. But every man has his freedom and need not touch this science if he does not wish to do so. Because no man has to eat or drink unless he so chooses, the science and study of philosophy is also limited by free will (I, 274).

At the end of Niceta's discourse, Saint Peter praises him. Thus, states Lemaire, since such interpretations are approved by the Prince of Apostles, his original interpretation is not wasted effort or a useless exercise. No one, he boasts, has explained the Judgment of Paris more thoroughly before in order to "combat the ignorant" (obvier aux ignorans) who say that poetry is full of lies (I, 275).

Lemaire attacked Guido delle Colonne and other "bad writers" because they did not know how to interpret the fables of poets, such as Homer. Paris was not a victim of fate; on the contrary, he retained his free will but gave into his natural inclination toward a life of pleasure due to the influence of Venus in his birth horoscope. Therefore, he did not, as Guido states, simply follow the "judgment of truth" in choosing Venus. Lemaire thus reconciles the pagan authors' fables and Christian morality.

Lemaire's version of the Judgment does indeed stand out from all those which preceded it on one important point. Lemaire is the first to emphasize the role of astrology in Paris' choice. At a time when divinatory astrology was hotly debated, Lemaire defended it throughout his works, but he was careful to leave room for free will. He believed that the stars were not causes but signs of man's fate. A prudent man could then transcend time by interpreting past and present events, and predicting future ones through the science of astrology.
Notes

1All subsequent citations will come from Stecher's edition of Lemaire's complete works.

2Raoul Le Feveres, in turn, based his Recueil des histoires de Troye (1464) on Guido's account and was undoubtedly counted among the "bad writers" attacked by Lemaire.

3Michael F. O. Jenkins has analyzed the speeches of the three goddesses in his Artful Eloquence (128-140).

4At the end of Venus' discourse, Lemaire describes Mercury in the following manner: "le noble Dieu Mercure, duquel la planete est neutre et indifferente, bonne avec les benioles, mauvaise avec les malivoles, maistresse de vertu imaginative, fantastique et cogitante. . ." (I, 249).
ENCORE TO A PERFECT DAY
by W. Clyde Tilley

The day moved on as best it could--
Its best, at worst, was very good:
The sun that spread its beams around;
The green grass carpet on the ground;
The fleecy clouds that floated by;
The deep blue background of the sky;
The stretch of hills that cupped its hands.
To make a playground of the land,
Where beasts and birds could work or play
Among the trees throughout the day.
Then when the sun had been tucked in
Behind the western hills again,
A sense of fullness hung about--
A sense that nothing had been left out.
But as encore to a perfect day
The sun flung back its bright array
In crimson tinge and orange light--
Day's afterglow of mingled night.
As incompatible as they may seem, the notions of religious authority and free inquiry are implicit in the idea of a Christian college. To ask whether the two can be related with consistency is the same as asking whether a Christian college is possible. To ask how they are to be related is the same as asking how it is that a Christian college is to proceed with its agenda.

To ask about the relation between religious authority and free inquiry in an absolute sense is to resurrect the age-old quandary, "What happens when an irresistible force meets an immovable object?" Religious authority, taken as an absolute, is like an immovable object in its dogmatism at best or in its fanaticism at worst. Free inquiry, taken as an absolute, is like an irresistible and unguided force in its scepticism—-in the worst sense of that word.

Christian education thus must be concerned with religious authority and free inquiry in a relative sense. This is but another way of speaking of the relationship between them. Before this relationship can be explored, each of the two terms must be subjected in its turn to the question, "What are some of the relativizing considerations that may be applied to this term without robbing it of its full value in the context of the Christian college?"

Let us reflect for a moment upon what the respective roles of our two terms are in the enterprise of Christian higher education. Religious authority must in some way refer to a content item without which a Christian college cannot be Christian. Free inquiry must in some way represent a method, in contrast to a content item, without which a Christian college will not be a college. The appropriation of this content and this method to each other in an institutional setting will require that the immovable object sacrifice some of its immovability and that the irresistible force sacrifice some of its irresistibility. Thus the question about relativizing considerations.

First, it can be seen that religious authority must itself be subjected to at least a minimum of inquiry if it is to be suited for purposes of higher education as opposed to mere indoctrination. There are many rival claims to religious authority, each claiming to be the authentic revelation of God. Such questions must then be raised as: What evidence is there that God has spoken? What reason is there to believe that this, in contrast to some other, purported revelation is the, or at least an, authentic source of divine authority? And if one will not raise such questions, he must at least be prepared to take such questions seriously when they are raised by others.

As a content item of religious faith embodied in some verbal expression, religious authority must be subjected to further scrutiny: What does this mean? How is it to be interpreted? What kind of language function is involved in this statement? How is this to be applied in the life situation? How is this to be related to other such statements? How, if at all, can the whole of such authoritative
statements be systematized into a coherent whole? These are the sorts of questions that a Christian higher educator must be willing and, to some degree, prepared to raise or at least to have raised.

Secondly, how shall the irresistible force of free inquiry be deprived of enough of its overbearing irresistibility to make it servicable in the yoke of Christian education alongside religious authority? The method of free inquiry apart from some mooring in terms of presuppositions and/or values could proceed in the educational setting no better than could religious authority which has no disposition to raise nor to answer questions concerning its own claims. It would be simultaneously besieged by the threat of arbitrariness, the dearth of criteria for knowing when indeed an inquiry had been successful, and the lack of methodologies by which the method of free inquiry might be implemented. To transcend these needs is to find oneself in possession of certain values and assumptions. If it is to be a Christian higher education, the Christian faith must in some way inform these necessary values and assumptions.

If only in some precursory way, this brief sketch can serve to show at least in theory how religious authority and free inquiry can be relativized so as both to need each other and to function together in the educational setting. We are more specifically interested though in what of the content of the Christian faith is essential as a functioning religious authority if the setting in which the spirit of free inquiry prevails is a Christian setting. The more broadly and loosely this content can be defined while remaining Christian, the more fortunate it will be for the spirit of free inquiry. It should after all be pointed out that we are not as yet specifying what situations must obtain if that Christian education is to be also Baptist or Presbyterian, Episcopal or Pentecostal.

In an attempt to isolate this content, we will speak of what is negotiable and what is not negotiable. Also it may prove helpful if we distinguish between two senses of negotiability and non-negotiability. Something may be negotiable in a methodological sense while not being negotiable in a confessional sense. One may be willing to subject a tenet of faith to free inquiry in a theoretical or methodological sense while seeing no practical need to do so from the standpoint of her own personal faith. She may be possessed with a psychological certainty about something that is based upon long years of satisfying experience in living out the truth of that tenet of faith. Yet as long as it is faith, this psychological certainty will stop short of logical certitude. The believer, within the spirit of free inquiry, should not be reluctant then to subject that cherished belief to the scrutiny of the most rigorous logic, even if she is fully confident of the outcome. New facets or implications of that truth may be forthcoming even when the prospects of proving or disproving that tenet are remote or even nonexistent. This is not even to mention the apologetic value of such rigorous investigation for the honest intellectual who may benefit even more in his search for enlightenment.

As a matter of theory or of methodological negotiability, it would seem that absolutely everything should be negotiable. This would include such basic things as the very existence of God. But when the matter of confessional negotiability arises, the realm must be more
closely circumscribed. This is like asking: What are we willing to give up, if necessary, and able to give up, if warranted, and still be Christian—a Christian college, a Christian educator, etc.?

I am going to suggest what seems to me an absolutely minimal residue of Christian theological content as the non-negotiable without which no education ought to claim to be Christian. I encountered this a number of years ago and, with slight adjustment, have found it to be quite servicable: "Hold fast in your commitment to Jesus Christ; as for the rest remain totally uncommitted."1 This much seems certainly necessary if the derivation of the word "Christian" itself is to retain any of its original content and offer any guidance at all in this project.

The real question it would seem is whether this is enough. Ought we to include other things on the commitment side of this compound imperative? Ought we to be more specific about what this commitment involves and who this Jesus is to whom we are committed? After all, commitment to Jesus Christ is a bit nebulous and suggests more about the way life is to be lived in terms of Lordship than it does about how truth is to be pursued.

I am personally inclined to answer both questions with a reserved "perhaps." But since it is a barely minimal standard we are in search of, I am also inclined to let this go for our present purposes with the slight adjustment alluded to above, partly because this is intended to be a paper more in the field of religious pedagogy than of theology or the philosophy of religion, which are here only secondary and servicable considerations. The revised standard I am suggesting runs as follows: "Hold fast in your commitment to Jesus Christ; as for the rest remain not totally committed." To remain "not totally committed" to the rest seems a fairer requirement than to remain "totally uncommitted" to it. After all, we have a workable commitment to many things which fall outside the pale of even psychological certainty. This is true because of the character of life itself which requires us to act upon the basis of the best we know or of that which seems most highly probable, even when there is lacking the conclusiveness which our anxious humanity would like.

This is true also because of the character of faith, all faith, which bids us take risks upon the basis of what we believe. William James has spoken of forced options where we cannot avoid taking some action even when we would like more evidence, for inaction or the failure to decide is itself a kind of action or of decision which can produce certain assets or liabilities for our lives.2 Yet these mandatory responses to the requirements of life and of faith are not best described as total uncommitments but as commitments that are not total, at least when compared to the authentic Christian's commitment to Jesus Christ.

Now there is another question: When Christian higher education is also Baptist higher education, must the scope of religious authority be expanded to include yet other theological non-negotiables? There are, as far as I can see, two possible options of response to this question, a negative option with its peculiar understanding of what comprises
Baptist higher education and an affirmative option with a likewise
peculiar slant of what it means for higher education to be Baptist.

The option which denies that additional theological riders should
further encumber the scope of theological non-negotiables is likely to
proceed in something of the following manner: Having a Baptist college
is a lot like having a Baptist hospital. There isn't a Baptist way to
practice medicine and there isn't a Baptist way to pursue education.
Both institutions and their attendant ministries are provided as
Christian acts of mercy and social benevolence. They are Christian only
in the sense that they are being done "in the name of Christ." Baptist
is only a designation of Christian sponsorship by a particular group of
Christians.

One may, on the other hand, see some disanalogies between a
hospital and a college which would warrant an affirmative answer to the
question about peculiar Baptist non-negotiables. Without illustrating
what these disanalogies might be, we may simply proceed to examine what
further tenets of faith would seem fair in a minimal structure of
religious authority for a Baptist College. First, it must be pointed
out that the Baptist umbrella is a rather broad one, covering quite a
diversity. Nor does it help much if one looks at the uniquely Southern
Baptist umbrella. This claim seems so obvious as to require no
justification, at least for our present purposes. Furthermore, this
pluralism within the Baptist camp is not the result of the erosion of
some previous unity during the years of Baptist historical development.
The same diversity is present when one attempts to trace this history to
its roots.

If it be asked: "What, if anything, do all Baptists of every
stripe and hue have in common?", two things leap quickly to mind: (1) a
high regard for Holy Scriptures and (2) the soul competency of each
individual before God. Although many other Christians have joined us in
these claims, they seem characteristically Baptist for two reasons. One
is that these are doctrines, and particularly the second, which Baptists
have not only held but have championed, often at great personal
sacrifice to our adherents. Secondly, these are so basic to our faith
that essentially every thing else that characterizes our existence as a
people is theoretically derivable and historically derived from these
two tenets.

It is also a crucial point in the Baptist heritage that the second
of these cardinal doctrines has tremendous implications for the first.
Although a strong view of Scripture has accompanied Baptist life on
every step of its chequered pilgrimage, the strong emphasis upon soul
competency has precluded the jurisdiction of others in dictating to each
individual believer what the specifics of interpretation and the details
of doctrine concerning that exalted Scripture must be. That is why we
have steered clear of setting for ourselves creeds and preferred
confessions of faith instead. The entrenched distinction between the
two is that a creed prescribes beliefs for all adherents whereas a
confession simply takes account of the fact that a group of assembled
Baptists have registered their consensus on flexibly stated articles of
doctrine. The creed has about it a binding effect which the confession
was never designed to have. The same principle is operative when a
denominational assembly passes a resolution which can have no power over
the individuals and churches which affiliate with that body. It is simply a collective witness since the convention is never more than those designated individuals ("messengers") who comprise the body for the duration of the assembly.

It will illustrate how pervasive this doctrine of soul competency is for Baptist life if we ponder how other doctrines have been generated from it. At every level of Baptist life, the call for freedom has been sounded. There is an emphasis upon individual salvation and regeneration, local church autonomy, freedom of conscience in matters of religion, and the separation of church and state. Although rooted firmly in Scripture, especially so with the emphasis upon the individual in matters of salvation and thus baptism, the vital seed of Biblical truth has attained its fruition upon the soil of freedom which respects the rights of the individual soul before God.

It is fortunate and even ideal then when the spirit of free inquiry is able to join itself with a religious authority in that enterprise of Christian higher education which is peculiarly Baptistic. This is at least true when the Baptist heritage is properly understood. What greater fit could truly be found than that which is offered between the spirit of free inquiry in education and the conviction of soul competency in religion?

Upon this basis I am prepared to offer then an affirmative proposal for what Baptists should regard as non-negotiable in the matter of a content that is religously authoritative. As a member of the Christian community, we will insist with all other Christians upon the centrality of Christ as indispensable. With a high view of Scripture, variously defined within our confessions and among our constituency, we will not sacrifice the Biblical witness to Christ although we will allow flexibility in the way we speak of him within the range of that witness. Also with an unanimous historical consensus upon the soul competency of each individual, we will not only allow but we will insist that the prevailing spirit in the higher educational enterprise be that of free inquiry.

Since a topic so broad can lend itself to almost indefinite expansion and to almost innumerable ramifications, I would like for purposes of wieldiness to set the remaining agenda at a limit of two additional considerations. First, what is the intended scope within which the Baptist axiom of complete religious freedom in matters of faith and practice should function? When we say that a person should be free to believe and thus proclaim anything his conscience dictates, what precisely do we mean? Where should he be free to do it? In society at large? In a Baptist college? In a Baptist church? Perhaps this issue has suffered from inattention.

Sometimes attempts have been made to justify the teaching material within a Baptist college curriculum on the grounds of our posture on religious freedom. Is this a responsible appeal in such situations? Is not this axiom of religious freedom a political one in which we advocate and defend the kind of political arrangement for our society that shall countenance unrestricted freedom in matters of religious faith and practice which shall not in turn infringe upon those same rights for others? It is not a statement advocating total freedom for teaching in
the institutions of a religious denomination or faith. It is precisely a tenet that lends for the right of a religion, any religion, to maintain institutions where it can specifically determine the curriculum of those institutions in accordance to that faith, a right which the institutions maintained by that state itself should be specifically precluded from having.

Our appeal for freedom in instruction and learning in higher education must be, not to our doctrine of religious freedom as a political right, but to the principle of fairness in the spirit of free inquiry as a sound approach to education. At this point our distinction between methodological and confessional negotiability can serve us well. Methodologically everything should be negotiable in a Christian/Baptist college? That is the spirit of free inquiry.

But what happens when in the spirit of free inquiry the methodology of open investigation makes substantial inroads into one's confessional faith, requiring concessions that were not anticipated? In other words, what professional and/or institutional responses should be forthcoming when in the course of exercising methodological negotiation the non-negotiable in one's confessional faith is impaired? It is not enough to appeal to the Baptist doctrine of religious freedom. This obviously will not do.

This of course is one of the values of stipulating what cannot be negotiated in a confessional sense to a bare minimum. It is possible that an open investigator in search for truth may find herself beyond the confessional pale of her institution in which she may for conscience sake decide to terminate her employment in that institution or in which the institution may choose to do so otherwise. The minimal scope of non-negotiables will make such occasions less frequent than is commonly imagined. In the light of it, one may expect a teaching contract to obligate the professor to teach within a basic Christian theistic and Christological framework and to guarantee his employment only so long as he can do so in good conscience.

In the case of a Baptist college, the preceding requirement will of course prevail. In addition, one should be able in good conscience to respect the authority of Scripture within the flexibility of interpretation which the doctrine of soul competency guarantees and particularly insofar as it relates to the Biblical witness to Jesus Christ, the center of our faith. Besides, one should also respect that constellation of doctrines which stems from the traditional Baptist emphasis upon religious freedom or at least not teach contrary to it. Let it be stressed again, however, that such infringements are much less common than are popularly imagined and certainly do not warrant the "witch hunt" mentality which currently averts us as a denomination.

In a final consideration, let us ask what implications this whole discussion can have for those who teach outside the specific realms of religious and/or philosophical studies. It is likely to be pointed out that the subject matter of most teaching areas simply does not obligate or even permit one to deal with most or even any of these issues. It will quickly be conceded that the content of Christian revelation does not proffer authoritative canons in other fields of inquiry, such as the
sciences, natural or social. Yet the truths derivable from Christian revelation have far-reaching, even all-inclusive implications.

In the light of this, it is certainly appropriate to speak of a Christian worldview. In a way that reneges on using the Bible, the record of this revelation, as an authoritative source on matters of natural science, history, geography, or grammar, there is implicit in the total approach to education the possibility of a Christian theistic worldview in all areas of instruction. It seems incumbent upon all of us within the employ of the institutions under question to embrace such a worldview in all good conscience and seriousness. Maximally, this would involve us in making explicitly clear in both word and deed our commitment to this faith and conviction that the subject matter we teach can and does function within that framework; minimally it would preclude callous statements and role models on our part that would undermine that faith in our charges.

So religious authority does not have to be an immovable object. Free inquiry does not have to be an irresistible force. In fact, the intercourse offered between them in a Christian college can be the most fortunate setting for both faith and learning.

ENDNOTES


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